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Resumen
La participación del trabajo en la renta nacional es constante bajo los supuestos de una
función de producción Cobb-Douglas y competencia perfecta. En este artículo se relajan
estos supuestos y se investiga si el comportamiento no constante de la participación del
trabajo en la renta nacional se explica por (i) una elasticidad de sustitución entre capital
y trabajo no unitaria y (ii) competencia no perfecta en el mercado de producto. Nos
centramos en España y los U.S. y estimamos una función de producción con elasticidad
de sustitución constante y competencia imperfecta en el mercado de producto. El grado
de competencia imperfecta se mide a través del cálculo del price markup basado en la
aproximación dual. Mostramos que la elasticidad de sustitución es mayor que uno en
España y menor que uno en los US. También mostramos que el price markup aleja la
elasticidad de sustitución de uno, lo aumenta en España, lo reduce en los U.S. Estos
resultados se utilizan para explicar la senda decreciente de la participación del trabajo en
la renta nacional, común a ambas economías, y sus contrastadas sendas de capital.
Abstract
The labor income share is constant under the assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function and perfect competition. This paper relaxes these assumptions and
investigates to what extent the actual non-constant behavior of this factor share is ex-
plained by (i) a non-unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and (ii)
non-perfect competition in the product market. We focus on Spain and the U.S. and
estimate a constant elasticity of substitution production function under imperfect compe-
tition in the product market. The degree of imperfect competition is measured through a
time series computation of the price markup following the dual approach. We show that
the elasticity of substitution is above one in Spain and below one in the US. We also show
that the price markup drives the elasticity of substitution away from one, upwards in
Spain, downwards in the U.S. These results are used to explain the declining path of the
labor income share, common to both economies, and their contrasted patterns in terms
of capital deepening.
JEL Classification: E22, E24, E25.
Keywords: Elasticity of substitution, Price markups, Factor shares.
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1 Introduction
The labor income share (LIS) is constant under the assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas (CD)
aggregate production function and perfect competition. Although these are widely used
assumptions, the prediction of a constant LIS is at odds with empirical evidence showing
that the LIS is time-varying in most countries at least in the medium run (see, among
many others, Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003; Ríos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis, 2007; and
Choi and Ríos-Rull, 2008). Figure 1 presents the Spanish and U.S. series and makes clear
that they have been far from constant in last decades.1
Figure 1. Labor income shares in Spain and the U.S.
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This wide evidence suggests that at least one of the assumptions has to be removed.
The immediate question, ‘Which one?’, is implicitly and ex-ante answered in most papers
when one (or both) of these standard assumptions is just dropped. However, surrounding
this question there a number of crucial issues which should deserve most attention from
the profession. For example, when diverging from the CD framework, what are the
diﬀerent implications for the LIS of having an elasticity of substitution above or below
one? What are consequences of diverging from a situation of perfect competition in
the product market? When none of the assumptions hold, to what extent does a non-
unitary substitution in technology explain the time-varying path of the LIS? To what
extent does it the degree of imperfect competition? What are the implications of the
value of the elasticity of substitution and the degree of imperfect competition for capital
accumulation?
1To check whether the labor shares in Spain and the U.S. can be treated as stationary or not we use
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Kwiatkowski - Phillips - Schmidt - Shin (KPSS) tests. We
obtain consistent results (which available upon request): according to the ADF test the null of a unit
root cannot rejected; according to the KPSS the null of stationarity is rejected. We conclude that during
our sample period these series have not evolved around a constant value.
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The aim of this paper is to provide answers to these questions by examining two
very diﬀerent economies like Spain and the U.S. In particular, we analyze how much of
the LIS variation in these countries is explained by a non-unit elasticity of substitution
and how much by non-perfect competition. In doing so, we contribute to the literature
in several respects such as the computation of an aggregate time-series measure of the
degree of imperfect competition in the product market, the estimation of the elasticity of
substitution under such imperfect competition, and the assessment of how the outcome
of these empirical exercises enlightens the characterization of the Spanish and U.S. labor
markets and of their aggregate technologies.
The non-constant behavior of the LIS has already been studied, often by considering
a single-departure from the two standard assumptions. For example, departures from the
CD production function are examined in Driver and Muñoz-Bugarín (2009), and Arpaia,
Pérez and Pichelmann (2009), who show the implied dynamics of the LIS when technology
is characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. In
turn, departures from perfect competition in the product market are explored, among
others, in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) and Estrada (2005), who also appraise the
dynamics of LIS when the price markup is non-constant. The work by Choi and Ríos-
Rull (2008) considers departures from the CD production function and perfect competition
in the labor market by introducing wage setting and frictions. They investigate whether
the dynamics of the LIS are better explained by non-competitive factor prices or by a
non-unit elasticity of substitution, and find the latter to be more important. This finding
is obtained through a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model where the value of
the elasticity of substitution is assumed and the path of the price markup is calibrated
accordingly.
Here we depart from the CD production function and perfect competition in the
product market and provide quantitative estimates of the LIS determinants. In this way,
our paper oﬀers two main contributions to this literature. First, a time-series calculation
of the aggregate price markup which we take as the aggregate proxy of the degree of
imperfect competition in the product market. Second, the estimation of the elasticity of
substitution under such product market imperfections.
The calculation of the price markup has attracted attention since the seminal con-
tribution by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).2 However, their methodology requires
information on the shape of the production function, in particular on the value of the
elasticity of substitution which is obviously unknown and must be estimated ex-ante. To
bypass these information requirements we track Roeger (1995), who obtains the price
markup from the diﬀerence between the primal and dual measures of the total factor
2See, among many others, Banerjee and Rusell (2004); Rawn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2004); Altug
and Filiztekin (2002); and Jamovich and Floetotto (2007).
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productivity (TFP). We follow a similar method and obtain the time path of the price
markup from a dual approach taking advantage of available information on factor prices.
This approach requires the obtainment of the rental price of capital and implies dealing
with data on capital stock, interest rates, and depreciation rates. For this, we rely mainly
on the OECD database to ensure comparable data, and thus comparable results. Once
the price markups are computed, we check their cyclical properties and we find them to
be countercyclical in both countries, with an average value around 31% in Spain and 35%
in the U.S. According to the literature these are standard properties of the price markup
(see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999; and Estrada, 2005).
Regarding the estimation of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor,
we assume a CES production function and face two methodological possibilities. On the
one hand, this elasticity can be directly obtained by applying non-linear methods, as done
by Duﬀy and Papageorgious (2000), and Klump, McAdam, and Willman (2007). On the
other hand, it can be obtained from the input demands, as in Antràs (2004), by applying
linear methods to the log-linearization of the CES input demands. We follow this second
approach.
We extend Antràs’ work by considering imperfect competition and augment the esti-
mation of the input demands by considering our computation of the price markup as a
proxy of the time-varying aggregate degree of product market imperfection. This econo-
metric exercise yields two main findings.
First, the elasticity of substitution is larger than one in Spain and smaller than one
in the U.S. To explain this finding, we show that the elasticity of substitution measures
the eﬀect of capital accumulation on the LIS. In Spain the LIS has decreased while the
ratio of capital to GDP has increased. These two facts imply an elasticity of substitution
larger than one. In contrast, both the ratio of capital to GDP and the LIS have decreased
in the U.S., which implies an elasticity of substitution lower than one.
Our second main finding is that consideration of the price markup drives the value
of the elasticity of substitution away from one and, therefore, provides a further cause
of rejection of the CD specification (Antràs, 2004). We show that if the price markup
is not considered the estimates of the elasticity of substitution are biased because of a
misspecification of the output elasticity of labor. This main result holds both for Spain
and the U.S. but goes in opposite direction: it yields an upward bias in Spain and a
downward bias in the U.S.
To check the robustness of our findings we perform an extra exercise. In the absence of
data measurement errors, a perfect estimation of the elasticity of substitution would yield
the same result no matter the price markup had been computed using the primal or the
dual approach. To have a sense of how far we are from this ideal situation, we derive and
regress a simple equation providing estimates of the values of the elasticity of substitution
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that minimize the diﬀerence between the primal- and dual-approach calculations of the
price markups. We find these new estimates to be broadly consistent with the ones
obtained by the estimation of the production function, especially in the U.S. where a
robust estimate is obtained.
Finally, we make use of the computed price markups and estimated values of the
elasticity of substitution to perform two simulations. In the first one we also take data
on GDP per worker and simulate the LIS in four diﬀerent scenarios that are used to
decompose the LIS and examine to what extent the price markup and the elasticity of
substitution account for significant portions of its actual trajectory. Because underlying
this simulation the TFP grows at a constant rate, we look at the permanent components of
the series and abstain from business cycle considerations . We find that the price markup
accounts for 63% of the LIS variation in Spain and 57% in the U.S., whereas the elasticity
of substitution explains, respectively, 27% and 39% of its variation. This implies that the
elasticity of substitution has less than half the explanatory power of the price markup in
Spain, and about two thirds of it in the U.S.
In a second simulation we analyze whether the time paths of GDP, capital accumula-
tion, employment growth and the LIS implied by the estimated values of the elasticity of
substitution and the computed price markup are consistent with the time series of these
variables (the value of the elasticity of substitution determines the relationship between
GDP in eﬃciency units and capital accumulation, while the value of the price markup
relates these two variables with the LIS and employment growth).3 In this exercise, we
extend the Solow model by considering (i) a CES production function; (ii) product mar-
ket imperfections, which are summarized by the price markup; and (iii) labor market
imperfections, which are introduced through a simple wage equation arising from a stan-
dard eﬃciency wage model. Accordingly, the labor market does not clear because wages
are set above their competitive value. Moreover, to obtain eﬃciency units of labor we
compute the Solow residual from an accounting exercise that takes into account that the
Solow residual is aﬀected by the price markup (Hall, 1988). Given that the TFP is not
restricted to grow at constant rate, in this simulation we work with the whole series and
do not abstain from their business cycle component.
This version of the Solow model is solved numerically in a base run scenario of non-
perfect competition and non-unit elasticities of substitution (i.e., in the presence of price
markups) and a scenario of perfect competition and elasticities of substitution close to one
(i.e., in the absence of price markups). The comparison of how the two scenarios predict
3The macroeconomic implications of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor have
been stressed by several authors. For example, Klump and Preisler (2000), Duﬀy and Papageorgious
(2000), and Acemoglu (2002), examine its implications for capital accumulation and long-run growth. In
turn, Rowthorn (1999) shows that capital accumulation aﬀects the long-run unemployment rate when
the elasticity of substitution diﬀers from one.
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the actual trajectories of the main macroeconomic variables reveals how important is to
take into account the degree of imperfect competition and its influence on technology.
When this is overlooked, the LIS displays a constant trajectory and the macroeconomic
predictions are seriously flawed. We conclude that economists should carefully design their
modeling assumptions before embarking on sophisticated analyses built up on excessively
unrealistic premises. This is specially important if the resulting outcomes are used for
policy advice.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shows the determinants of the LIS.
Section 3 computes the time path of the price markup which is used, in Section 4, for
the estimation of the production function. Section 5 studies the determinants of the LIS.
Section 6 augments the Solow model to examine the consequences of a non-unit elasticity
of substitution and non-perfect competition on capital accumulation and labor market
performance. Section 7 concludes.
2 The labor income share
In this section we derive the equation of the LIS when there is non-perfect competition
and the aggregate technology is characterized by the following CES production function:
 =  ( ) =
h
 ()−1 + (1− ) ()−1
i −1  (1)
where  is GDP, is the aggregate stock of capital,  is employment,  is technological
augmenting labor, and   0 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and eﬃciency
units of labor.
Under imperfect competition in the product market, profit maximization implies
 =  ( ) = (1− )
h
 ()−1 + (1− ) ()−1
i −1−1
()−1 −1 (2)
where  measures the price markup,  is the wage per unit of labor and  is the
marginal product of labor. This equation is presented in Galí (1996) and corresponds to
the first order condition for a symmetric equilibrium. It is derived assuming monopolistic
competition with  symmetric sectors with  = −1  where  is the elasticity of substitu-
tion of consumers’ and firms’ demand, that we assume to be equal. Combining equations
(1) and (2), we obtain the following expression for the LIS:
 =  =
µ
1− 

¶µ 

¶ 1−  (3)
This equation shows that the LIS depends: (i) on the time path of the price markup
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(always); and (ii) on the average labor productivity in eﬃciency units whenever  6= 1.
Using (1), the average productivity can be rewritten as
µ 
 
¶ 1−
=
1

³

 
´−1
+ (1− )

so that
 =
µ
1

¶⎛
⎜⎝ 1− 

³

´−1
+ (1− )
⎞
⎟⎠  (4)
Note that average productivity depends on the capital labor ratio in eﬃciency units
(i.e., the ratio between capital and eﬃciency units of labor) and, thus, it is related to
capital deepening. Note also that equation (4) implies a relationship between the LIS and
capital deepening that depends on the value of . If the elasticity of substitution is larger
than one, capital deepening reduces the LIS. If it is smaller than one, capital deepening
increases the LIS.
>From this perspective it is now easy to see the strong assumptions introduced in
related literature when explaining the dynamics of the LIS. On the one hand, Bils (1987)
and Galí (1995) assume  = 1 (i.e., a Cobb-Douglas production function) so that these
dynamics can only arise from the evolution of the price markup. On the other hand, under
the assumption that  = 1 (i.e., perfect competitive markets), the price markup eﬀect
vanishes and the dynamics of the LIS are explained just by capital deepening. The latter
is the route followed by Antràs (2004), who assumes perfect competitive markets and uses
data on the LIS to estimate the U.S. production function. In our analysis, which is free
from these restrictions ( 6= 1,   1), we use the dynamics of the LIS to estimate the
elasticity of substitution when the price markup is time-varying (Section 4). The main
diﬃculty at this point lies in the calculation of the time-varying price markup. Section 3
deals with this issue.
3 The price markup
Most of the related literature follows Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and obtains the
price markup using the Solow residual, which is
∆
 =
1

∆
 −
µ
1− 

¶ ∆
 −
∆
  (5)
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where  is the output elasticity of labor. Given that  =  (from the first order
conditions of the firms’ problem) and using equation (3) we obtain
∆
 +
∆
 =
1

∆
 +
µ
1− 1
¶µ∆
 +
∆

¶
− ∆ 
When the latter is combined with equation (5) we have
∆
 =
µ +  − 1

¶ ∆
 −
µ
( − 1) (1−)

¶ ∆
 −
∆
 −
∆
  (6)
Although his expression is commonly used in the literature to compute the growth rate of
the price markup, it is not useful for us. The problem lies in the unobservable nature of
the values of the aggregate price markup and the elasticity of substitution. This problem
may be solved by introducing assumptions on these values. However, these unknowns are
precisely the two variables we seek to quantitatively approach in this paper.
In view of these problems, we follow a dual approach and compute the price markup
directly from its definition
 = +  (7)
where  is the rental price of capital. From equation (7), we obtain
∆
 =
∆
 −


µ∆
 +
∆

¶
−
µ∆
 +
∆

¶

so that
∆
 =
∆
 −
µ∆
 +
∆

¶
− (1−)
µ∆
 +
∆

¶
 (8)
Equations (7) and (8) characterize the dual approach to compute the price markup.
Note that the path of the markup can be characterized without any assumption on the
aggregate production function. The only requirement is data availability on GDP, capital
stock, employment, wages and the rental price of capital. The first three variables, the
quantities, are directly available through the OECD database. The latter two, the prices,
require some extra work.
Wages need to be computed because the total compensation of dependent employees
must be adjusted by the share of the pie corresponding to self-employment (Gollin, 2002).
For this, we use the GDP at factor costs and compute self-employed income as eﬀectively
labor income. On this basis,  is defined as  , where  is the (adjusted) LIS.
For the rental price of capital, , we have two possibilities. The first one is based
on the National Accounts so that  is computed as the share of payments to capital in
total income divided by the capital-output ratio. This measure is directly at hand since
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we have data on  and  (in real terms), and we have just computed the (adjusted)
LIS, . Thus, the solid line in Figures 2a (for Spain) and 3a (for the U.S.) is just the
rental price of capital computed as (1−) . Obviously, this measure implies a situation
of perfect competition and no price mark-up.
The second possibility is to compute a price-based measure of  following Hsieh
(1999). In front of the problems of bad national statistics, Hsieh argues that price-based
estimates have the advantage of being “based on market prices (namely, wages and interest
rates) paid by agents who have every incentive to get the prices right” [p. 134]. Using
this approach, the rental price of capital is obtained from the following non-arbitrage
condition:
 = 


 =


µ
 − ∆

 + 

¶

where  is the nominal rental price of capital,  is the nominal price of one unit of
capital,  is the depreciation rate of capital,  is the nominal interest rate, and  is a
price index. For capital stock, the OECD database only supplies the aggregate series.
Thus, to compute  and  we use the FBBVA-IVIE database for Spain and, the NIPA
(National Income and Product Accounts) for the U.S.4 As a measure of the annual interest
rate, for Spain we use the nominal long-term interest rate on government bonds, while
for the U.S. we use the Federal Funds rate.5 Finally, for  we use the GDP deflator.
Relying on this data, we obtain a homogeneous and, for our purposes, suﬃciently long
time series which we plot as a dotted line in Figures 2a and 3a. Based on this measure of
, Figures 2b and 3b show the implied price markup for Spain and the U.S.
4These databases provide the following depreciation rates. For Spain (average for 1964-2007): (i)
Residential buildings: 1.10%; (ii) Other construction: 1.53%; (iii) Transport equipment: 14.43%; (iv)
Machinery equipment: 10.97%. Overall, the depreciation rate is 2.49%. For the U.S. (average for
1960-2007), these rates are: (i) Residential buildings: 1.47%; (ii) Nonresidential buildings: 4.68%; (iii)
Structures: 2.32%; Equipment and Software: 12.17%. The overall depreciation rate is 3.34%. Note that
they are consistent with Hsieh’s (1998) reported ones: (i) Residential buildings: 1.3%; (ii) Non-residential
buildings: 2.9%; (iii) Other construction: 2.1%; (iv) Transportation equipment: 18.2%; (v) Machinery
equipment: 13.8%.
5For Spain the long-term government bond yield corresponds to the weighted average yields of bonds
with maturities of more than two years, weighting the yield of each operation by the negotiated amount.
This series is originally supplied by the Bank of Spain. We also experimented with various other series.
For Spain, we used a short-run interest rates consisting on the 3-month interbank loans computed as the
average of the 3-month interbank rate weighted by the value of credit granted, which is also originally
supplied by the Bank of Spain. For the U.S., the rental price of capital was also computed for a short
and a long—run interest rate. For the first one, we used the 3-month LIBOR (London Interbank Oﬀered
Rate), which is the rate of interest at which banks oﬀer to lend money to one another in the wholesale
money markets in London, and is a standard financial index used in U.S. capital markets. For the second
one, we used the rate on the 10-year government bonds. It is important to note that all these series yield
a similar picture both in terms of  and in terms, consequently, of the price markup. We opted for the
long-run series given that the series on the short-term interest rates for Spain only starts at the end of
the 70s, and we thus loose too many degrees of freedom.
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Figure 2. Returns to capital and price markups in Spain.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05
Returns to capital
Dual approach
(with price markups)
Implied by National Accounts
(no price m arkup)
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1.30
1.35
1.40
1.45
1.50
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05
Price markups
Figure 3. Returns to capital and price markups in U.S.
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This price markup has four noteworthy characteristics. First, it follows a sort of U
shaped trajectory, with a downward path in the aftermath of the oil price crisis, which
subsequently turns into a rise. Second, this path is overall stationary since, according to
the KPSS test, the null of stationarity cannot be rejected at a 5% critical value. This
null, in contrast, is rejected in the case of the labour share . This implies, for example,
that a mark-up measure for Spain based on the inverse of the LIS would probably mix
information on the price markup and the downward-pushing capital deepening. The third
characteristic is that this price-based markup evolves well above 1. This indicates the ex-
istence of imperfect competition and significant price markups which are, on average, 31%
in Spain and 35% in the U.S. It seems a sensible measure given the 38% value at which
Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), based on GMM estimates, place the steady state
price mark-up in the U.S. in 1967-2003. Note, also, that  = 135 implies that around a
quarter of the national income (GDP) is generated through market power and thus corre-
sponds to monopolistic rents
³−(+)
 =
−1
 = 026%
´
. The fourth characteristic is a
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countercyclical behavior. As stressed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), this counter-
cyclical behavior reconciles theory and empirical evidence on the procyclical behavior of
wages. We follow these authors and compute the correlation of our cyclical indicator of
the price markup —the growth rate of the price markup— with the HP filtered GDP, the
linearly detrended hours, and the HP filtered hours (HP stands for Hodrick-Prescott). For
Spain we find, respectively, the following correlation coeﬃcients: -0.28, -0.20, and -0.23.
For the U.S., in turn, we find -0.25, -0.08, and -0.04. In view of these results, we conclude
that our price markup time series is countercyclical.
4 The production function
In this section we estimate the production function and obtain the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor. We follow Antràs’ (2004) methodology, but diverge in one
important respect. Rather than assuming perfect competition, we consider the price
markup as a relevant determinant of the relationships at work. Thus, our contribution
lies in the obtainment of new estimates of the elasticity of substitution under imperfect
competition.
Following Antràs, we assume a functional form of the technological parameters so that
labor eﬃciency increases at a constant growth rate, i.e.  = 0 where  is the growth
rate of technological change. From the first order conditions of the firms’ maximization
problem, we obtain the labor demand
 = (1− )
µ

¶ 1
()−1  (9)
which can be rewritten as
ln
µ

¶
= 1 +  ln + (1− ) (10)
or
ln () = 2 + 1 ln
µ

¶
−
µ
1− 

¶
 (11)
where 1 and 2 are constants and (10) and (11) are, respectively, the inverse and direct
labor demands.
4.1 The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
We next estimate the labor demand equation both under perfect competition, as Antràs
(2004), and under imperfect competition by considering the price markup time series
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computed in the previous section.6 To conduct the estimation, we follow the cointegration-
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing procedure developed in Pesaran
and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al. (2001). Its main advantage is that it can be used
irrespective of whether the underlying regressors are integrated of order one, zero, or
are fractionally integrated. In this way we avoid the pretesting problem implicit in the
standard cointegration techniques, that is, in the Johansen maximum likelihood, and the
Phillips-Hansen semi-parametric fully-modified OLS procedures. Nevertheless, we will
also check that our ARDL estimates are consistent with the ones that would be obtained
using Johansen’s procedure (see Tables 2 and 4, below). As shown in Harris and Sollis
(2003), other advantages of the ARDL method are that it yields consistent long-run
estimates of the equation parameters even for small size samples and under potential
endogeneity of some of the regressors.
Table 1 presents labor demand estimates for Spain distinguishing two versions. The
first one, named 1, is equation (11) and has  as dependent variable (the variables
are always defined in logs). The second one, named 2, is equation (10) having  as
dependent variable. The first block, in the left-hand side of the table, shows the results
when the price markup is taken into account. The second block, in the right-hand side,
shows the same estimates without considering the price markup. These extra equations
are named 10 and 20.
The estimates of1 and10 reveal similar levels of inertia, with persistence coeﬃcients
around 0.80 and alike short-run elasticities of the dependent variable with respect to 
(given the similar values of the persistent coeﬃcients, the long-run ones are also alike).
 is significant at a 10% critical value in 1 but it is not significant in 10. The
trend displays opposite signs and is not significant at conventional critical values. Both
equations pass the standard misspecification and structural stability tests. Regarding
2, the persistence coeﬃcient is extremely large and close to a unit root (0.97), the
coeﬃcient on  is not significant, and the residuals are homoscedastic. Thus, the
preferred estimated version of the labor demand is 1, which is the one we use to derive
the estimates of .
According to equation 1, the elasticity of substitution in Spain is 158 (= 1063,
where 0.63 is the long-run elasticity of  with respect to ).7 This is in fact the
value we credit, since the results from equation 2 are highly inconclusive due to the
two above mentioned problems (residuals not normal and lack of significance of the 
6Following Antràs (2004), we have also estimated the demand of capital, both for Spain and the U.S.
However, since the corresponding results are very poor and no significant conclusions can be obtained,
we have chosen no to present them, but make them available upon request.
7This long-run elasticity is obtained as the long-run coeﬃcient of , that is 0.13/(1-0.79). It is
important to note that we always work with the exact values of the coeﬃcients. Therefore, even though
the ratio above yields 0.62, the true long-run elasticity is 0.63. And the accurate estimate of  is 1.58,
not the 1.59 resulting from 1/0.63.
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coeﬃcient). Its counterpart with no price markup, 10, yields  = 121 = 1083, where
0.83 is the long-run elasticity of  with respect to .8 We conclude that (i) Spain has
an elasticity of substitution above 1, which we place at 1.58; and, (ii) failure to consider
the price markup generates a downward bias in the estimation of .
Table 1. Spanish labor demand. 1967-2007.
Price markup considered Price markup not considered
[1] [2] [10] [20]
 073
[0273]  014[0643]  024[0259]  012[0513]
ln(−1−1) 079
[0000] ln
³ −1
−1
´
097
[0000] ln(−1) 084[0000] ln
³ −1
−1
´
085
[0000]
ln
³

´
013
[0095] ln() 003[0617] ln
³

´
013
[0169] ln() 015[0047]
∆ln
³

´
091
[0002] ∆ln
³

´
051
[0006]  029[0032]
 ∗ 100 017
[0207]  ∗ 100 −013[0027]  ∗ 100 −007[0241]  ∗ 100 001[0803]
2 0988 0998 2 0997 0998
 0027 0013  0014 0011
Misspecification tests: Misspecification tests:
 111
[0292] 187[0171]  012[0734] 241[0121]
 064
[0423] 0175[0676]  188[017] 132[0250]
 100
[0606] 193[0381]  051[0775] 144[0487]
 158
[0208] 587[0015]  176[0185] 333[0068]
Notes: Dependent variables: ln() in 1, ln() in 10, and ln() in 2 and 20;∆ is the diﬀerence operator;  the standard error; p-values in square brackets.
Misspecification tests: Serial correlation , Linearity  , Normality ,
and Heteroscedasticity  .
Because our interest lies in the implied long-run relationships between  and ,
in Table 2 we present the coeﬃcients of the error correction model () and the long-
run relationships (or cointegrating vectors) underlying the estimated equations (they are
obtained from the reparameterizing equations 1 and 2 in error correction form). Next
to these results, obtained via the ARDL method, we also present the cointegrating vector
resulting from conducting the same analysis using the Johansen procedure.9 Finally, we
8The estimate of the elasticity of substitution could be wrongly placed around 1 in case of ignoring the
price markup. In particular, following equation 20,  would be estimated at 098, which is the long-run
elasticity of  with respect to 
9Underlying this exercise is (i) the performance of unit root tests; (ii) the estimation of VAR models
having the same lag structure and containing the same variables than the structural equations; and (iii)
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show the results of a likelihood ratio (LR) test following a 2 (·) distribution that restricts
the Johansen values to take the ARDL values. Non rejection of the LR test provides
evidence on the results’ consistence across econometric methodologies.
In Spain this consistency cannot be rejected for any of the two versions of the labor
demand. However, note that for 2 the second term of the ARDL cointegrating vector
(i.e., the long-run elasticity of elasticity  with respect to ) is not significant. These
results reinforce our choice of 158 as our best estimate of .
Table 2. Long-run relationships in Spain.
ARDL Johansen LR Test
−1 ¡ ln () ln ¡¢ ¢ ¡ ln () ln ¡ ¢ ¢
[1] −021
[0079]
³
1 063
[0004]
´ ¡
1 054 ¢ 2 (1)=0.35[0553]
−1 ¡   ¢ ¡   ¢
[2] −003
[0346]
³
1 078
[0434]
´ ¡
1 263 ¢ 2 (1)=5.34[0021]
Notes: p-values in square brackets; 5% critical value: 2 (1)=3.84.
Tables 3 and 4 are, respectively, the US counterparts of Tables 1 and 2 for Spain.
Regarding the estimation of equation (11), the version with the price markup (3) results
in a much lower persistence coeﬃcient, 0.50, than the version with perfect competition
(30)  where it attains 0.73. This would result on diﬀerent long-run elasticities of 
and  with respect to  for equal short-run coeﬃcients on . However, even
the short-run coeﬃcients, 0.79 and 0.27, diﬀer substantially. As in Spain, the trend (not
significant at conventional critical values) displays opposite signs and both equations pass
the standard misspecification and structural stability tests. The estimation of equation
(10), named 4 yields a very similar picture than its counterpart 3, with a similar
persistence coeﬃcient around 0.50 and a short-run coeﬃcient of  with respect to
 of 021. This results in relatively close estimates of . However, given that the
residuals in equation 2 are not normal, we credit the elasticity of substitution obtained
through 3, which will be compared to the one obtained through 30. Note, also, that
the selected estimates of  for Spain and the U.S. are taken from the same specification.
This ensures consistent results across countries and warrants comparability.
According to equations 3 and 30, the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor in the U.S. is below 1. When the price markup is considered, we find it to be
the use of LR tests based on the maximal eigenvalue and the trace of the stochastic matrix to determine
the existence of cointegrating vectors (and its number and values). Given that we estimate VAR models
with unrestricted constants and trends and two I(1) variables, we need to test one restriction. All these
underlying results are available upon request.
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063 (= 1158, where 1.58 is the long-run elasticity of  with respect to ). In the
absence of the price markup, we find it to be 096 (= 11014, where 1.014 is the long-run
elasticity of  with respect to ). Antràs (2004) shows that the estimation of the
equivalent equation in the U.S. yields  = 089 when the preferred estimation method
—Saikkonen’s one— is used. Therefore, our results are consistent with those in Antràs
(2004) and, interestingly enough, uncover a new relationship: consideration of the price
markup reduces the elasticity of substitution in the U.S.10
Table 3. U.S. labor demand. 1962-2007.
Price markup considered Price markup not considered
[3] [4] [30] [40]
 −314
[0164]
 246
[0000]  −012[0814]  132[0026]
ln(−1−1) 050
[0004] ln
³ −1
−1
´
056
[0000] ln(−1) 073[0000] ln
³ −1
−1
´
071
[0026]
∆ ln () 027
[0078] ln() 021[0000] ∆ ln () 019[0103] ln() 017[0143]
ln
³

´
079
[0027] ln
³

´
027
[0004]  057[0000]
∆ ln
³

´
070
[0061] ∆ ln
³

´
021
[0107]
 ∗ 100 −045
[0131]
 ∗ 100 033
[0000]  ∗ 100 008[0230]  ∗ 100 020[0008]
2 0981 0998 2 0997 0997
 0025 0009  0008 0010
Misspecification tests: Misspecification tests:
 014
[0712] 002[0890]  012[0734] 040[0525]
 0001
[0973] 011[0742]  188[017] 076[0384]
 031
[0854] 724[0027]  051[0775] 486[0088]
 010
[0752] 073[0392]  176[0185] 031[0579]
Notes: Dependent variables: ln() in 3, ln() in 30, and ln() in 4 and 40;∆ is the diﬀerence operator;  the standard error; p-values in square brackets.
Misspecification tests: Serial correlation , Linearity  , Normality ,
and Heteroscedasticity  .
As in the Spanish case, when checking for consistency between our ARDL estimates
and the ones that would be obtained from the Johansen procedure, we cannot reject the
LR test.
10This conclusion also holds when looking at the  estimates derived from estimation of equation 4
(047) and 40 (059), which also fit within the range of estimates provided by Antràs (2004).
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Table 4. Long-run relationships in the U.S.
ARDL Johansen LR Test
−1 ¡   ¢ ¡   ¢
[3] −050
[0004]
³
1 158
[0000]
´ ¡
1 0405 ¢ 2 (1)=2.59[0108]
−1 ¡   ¢ ¡   ¢
[4] −044
[0000]
³
1 047
[0000]
´ ¡
1 0403 ¢ 2 (1)=1.37[0243]
Notes: p-values in square brackets; 5% critical value: 2 (1)=3.84.
This empirical analysis yields two important conclusions. First, the elasticity of sub-
stitution between capital and labor is larger than 1 in Spain and smaller than 1 in the
U.S. Second, consideration of the price markup causes the estimates of this elasticity to
be drawn apart from 1. In other words, the assumption of perfect competition introduces
a bias on its estimate which diﬀers depending on the estimated value. It is a downward
bias in Spain and an upward bias in the U.S.
In what follows we rationalize these two conclusions by using an accounting exercise
based on equation (6) rewritten as
∆
 −
µ∆
 −
∆

¶
=
µ
1−

¶µ∆
 −
∆

¶
| {z }

µ
1− 

¶
− ∆ 
so that the left hand side of the equation coincides with the growth rate of the LIS.
Therefore,
∆
 = 
µ
1− 

¶
− ∆ 
Note that the growth rate of the LIS depends on capital deepening (measured by the
diﬀerence between the growth rates of capital and GDP)11 and on the growth rate of
the price markup. As mentioned, the eﬀect of capital deepening on the LIS depends on
the elasticity of substitution. Capital deepening increases the LIS when the elasticity is
smaller than one and decreases when it is larger than one.
The latter expression allows us to rationalize the two main conclusions obtained from
the econometric analysis. To this end, we can rewrite it as follows:
∆
 +
∆
 = 
µ
1− 

¶
 (12)
11The CES production function implies a direct relationship between the ratio of capital to GDP and
the ratio of capital to labor. Thus, capital deepening implies an increase in the ratio of capital to GDP.
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The left hand side of this equation is on average negative both in Spain and the U.S.,
with sample period means at -0.15% and -0.29%, respectively, that are clearly dominated
by the LIS growth rates (the growth rates of the price markup are much smaller and play
a minor role).12 By implication, the right hand side must also take negative values. This
situation is pictured in Figure 4, where the continuous line displays the right hand side of
equation (12) as a function of  taking into account that  takes a negative value in the
U.S. and a positive one in Spain.13 As it is clear from this Figure, when the LIS shows a
downward path and there is capital deepening, the elasticity of substitution must be larger
than one. In turn, when both the LIS and the ratio GDP/capital falls, the elasticity of
substitution must be smaller than one. This explains the first conclusion above regarding
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in Spain and the U.S.
Figure 4. Equation (12).
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Note: Continuous lines denote the function
¡
1−

¢ when the price markup is considered;
dashed lines show the same function when the price markup is not considered.
Regarding the eﬀect of the price markup on the estimated , note that omission of the
markup underestimates the value of the labor-output elasticity which, in turn, generates
an overestimation of the absolute value of . The dashed lines in Figure 4 display the
12Related with these figures, it is worth recalling that in both cases the LIS behaves as non-stationary
in contrast with the stationary path of the price markup.
13Note that  is the product of two terms. The first one is positive, whereas the second one is positive
when there is capital deepening and negative otherwise. Data from the OECD shows that during the
period there is capital deepening in the spanish economy, implying a positive value of  and there is a
reduction in the ratio capital to GDP in the US economy, implying a negative value of .
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right hand side of equation (12) as a function of  when  is overestimated due to the
absence of the price markup. As shown in Figure 4, this implies that, in the absence
of the price markup, the estimated value of  is biased towards one. This explains the
second conclusion.
Remark 1 An interesting implication of our findings is that the high elasticity of substi-
tution in the Spanish economy implies that higher wages (in eﬃciency units) will reduce
the labor income share as firms respond to this rise by substituting labor for capital more
than proportionally with respect to the wage rise. On the contrary, the low value of the
elasticity of substitution in the U.S. implies that higher wages (in eﬃciency units) gener-
ate a less than proportional response by firms, which therefore allows a larger LIS. This
remark follows from rewriting equation (4) as:
 =
µ
(1− )

¶µ

¶1−
 (13)
4.2 The primal and dual paths of the markup
The price markup was computed in Section 3 following the dual approach. If data were
perfect and the elasticity of substitution could be perfectly estimated, the dual approach-
based markup would coincide with the primal approach-based markup obtained from
equation (6). In this section we evaluate the extent to which these two measures diﬀer.
To this end, we rewrite equation (6) as equation (12) to obtain a relationship between the
LIS and the growth of the price markup. We use this relationship to regress the following
equation: ∆
 =  − 
∆
 +  (14)
where  ¡= 1− ¢ and  are the parameters to be estimated, and  is the residual of the
equation. The growth rate of the price markup in this expression is the one obtained from
the dual approach. Therefore, from this regression we obtain the values of the elasticity of
substitution that minimize the diﬀerence (or error) between the primal and dual measures
of the price markup. The results of this estimation are presented in Table 5.
Our estimation is based on equation (14), rather than on equation (12), because the
estimates of  are significantly diﬀerent from -1. When we restrict  = −1, which would
be the implicit value of  in equation (12), we find non-sensible results. However, when
this parameter is left free (as in Table 5), it is interesting to observe that the estimated
values of  for Spain and the U.S. are broadly consistent with the estimates of  obtained
via the estimation of the production function. Of course, the drawback of this exercise is
the poor performance of the Spanish and U.S. econometric versions of equation (14), with
poor explanatory power and coeﬃcients that in some cases are not significant. However,
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we find remarkable that our finding of  = −0327 for Spain implies  = 149, whereas
our estimate of  = 0967 for the U.S. implies  = 051. Recall that if data were perfect
these values of  would coincide, respectively, with 158 and 063.
Table 5. Primal approach-based estimates of .
Spain
 
∆ = −0327[0492] −0237[0002] 
2 = 019  = 195
U.S.
 
∆ = 0967[0102] −0076[0242] 
2 = 008  = 180
Note: Probabilities in brackets; =Durbin-Watson statistic.
5 Simulated labor income shares
In this section, we answer some of the questions we were asking at the beginning of the
paper. In particular, we examine how much of the variation of the LIS is explained by the
value of  (capital deepening) and how much by the trajectory of the price markup. To
address this question, we use equation (3) to simulate the path of the LIS. As inputs of the
simulation we need the path of GDP per eﬃciency unit of labor, the value of parameter
, our estimates of , and our dual measure of the price markup. GDP per eﬃciency unit
of labor is obtained from the ratio between GDP per worker and technology. To obtain
the technological path we assume, as we did in the previous section, that it grows at a
constant rate. This rate is set at the sample period average growth rate of per worker
GDP, which is equal to 2.14% in Spain and 1.55% in the U.S. In turn, the value of  is set
so that the simulated LIS coincides with actual LIS in the initial period. Since the growth
rate of the TFP is constant, we abstain from business cycle considerations and conduct
our simulation on the trend component of the actual LIS, which is obtained through the
HP filter.
We distinguish four diﬀerent scenarios that combine (i) the presence and absence of
the price markup in the simulation; and (ii) the  estimates obtained when the price
markup is, and is not, included in the regression. In this way we can infer to what extent
the elasticity of substitution or the price markup play dominant roles in explaining the
actual trajectories of the labor share in Spain and the U.S. The resulting simulations are
plotted in Figure 5 and their fit is evaluated in Table 6.
In Scenarios I and III we consider the estimated  obtained in the presence of the price
markup, 1.58 in Spain, and 0.63 in the US. Scenario I, where the simulation is conducted
20
in the presence of the markup (in contrast to Scenario III), is our base run model. The
resulting time series provide the closest approximation to the actual labor share trajecto-
ries in both economies with residual sum of squares (RSS) and 2 of, respectively, 0.017
and 0.65 in Spain, and 0.007 and 0.93 in the U.S.
The second scenario is one of perfect competition (the price markup is not considered
neither in the estimated regression nor in the simulated time path of the labor share) and
provides the closest situation to the Cobb-Douglas case. It is thus natural to obtain a
relatively constant labor share in both countries with, nevertheless, significant diﬀerences:
the simulated path in Spain evolves slightly downwards initially, when the actual labour
share is rising, and upwards subsequently, when the labour share trends downwards. As a
consequence, the correlation coeﬃcient and explanatory power of the simulated series are
virtually null. In contrast, the simulated series in the U.S. behaves more in accordance
with the initially downward and finally constant actual path, thereby resulting in a much
accurate fit than in Spain (see Table 6).
Figure 5. Simulated labor shares.
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Note: Simulations I to IV correspond, respectively, to Scenarios I to IV in Table 6.
Simulations in Scenario III use the estimated sigma in the presence of the price markup,
but the price markup series is not used when computing the simulated path. Therefore,
the diﬀerence between the simulated series under Scenarios I and III accounts for the
contribution of the price markup to the LIS trajectory. In turn, in Scenario IV we use the
estimated sigma with no markup, but the price markup is considered in the simulation.
Hence, the diﬀerence between the simulated series under Scenarios I and IV accounts for
the contribution of capital deepening to the LIS trajectory. To approximate these two
contributions we follow Karanassou et al. (2003, p. 261) and regress the contribution
of the markup on a constant and the contribution of capital deepening. We save the
residuals and regress the actual LIS over a constant and the saved residuals. The 2
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of this regression gives us the portion of the LIS variation explained by the part of the
markup contribution that is uncorrelated with the contribution of capital deepening. We
find it to be 63% in Spain and 57% in the U.S. Similarly, when we regress the actual LIS
on the residuals of a regression of the capital deepening contribution on a constant and
the contribution of the markup, we find the 2 to be 0.27 in Spain and 0.39 in the U.S.
This result indicates that capital deepening, which reacts to , is also a driving force of
the labor share trajectory as it explains 27% and 39% of the LIS variation.
Table 6. Simulated labor shares’ fit.
Spain U.S.
ˆ  RSS 2 ˆ  RSS 2
Scenario I 1.58 X 0.017 0.65 0.63 X 0.007 0.93
Scenario II 1.21  0.047 0.03 0.90  0.013 0.47
Scenario III 1.58  0.048 0.03 0.63  0.013 0.47
Scenario IV 1.21 X 0.023 0.53 0.90 X 0.010 0.60
Notes: RSS = Residual sum of squares; the 2 and the RSS are obtained
from regressing the actual trend-component of the LIS
on a constant and the simulated LIS in each scenario.
The conclusion we draw from this exercise is threefold. First, our base run case is able
to proxy the path followed by the LIS in last decades in the two economies considered.
The corresponding 2s are 0.65 in Spain and 0.93 in the U.S. Second, both the price
markup and capital deepening contribute to explain this path, although the price markup
is clearly more determinant in Spain. Third, the explanatory power of , and thus of
capital deepening, is less than half the explanatory power of the price markup in Spain,
but two thirds of it in the U.S. This is consistent with the larger ratio of capital stock per
employee in the U.S.14
6 Capital accumulation and labor income share
The elasticity of substitution determines the relationship between GDP (in eﬃciency units
and capital accumulation), while the price markup relates these two variables with the
LIS and employment growth. This leads us to bring the analysis into a broader macro-
economic context, which we do by augmenting the Solow model. We then simulate it
and compare the resulting predictions with the actual time-series of GDP, capital ac-
cumulation, employment growth, and the LIS. We consider a base run scenario in the
14The process of capital deepening has been larger in Spain than in the US. However, since the capi-
tal/output is higher in the US throughout the whole sample period, smaller variations in capital deepening
turn out to be more influential than the larger variations of the smaller Spanish ratio.
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presence of our price markups (so that there is imperfect competition and the elasticities
of substitution diﬀer from one) and a scenario in their absence (so that there is perfect
competition and the elasticities of substitution are close to one). Comparison of how the
two scenarios predict the actual trajectories of the main macroeconomic variables informs
on the extent to which the degree of imperfect competition and its influence on technology
are important ingredients of the model.
6.1 The model
We extend the Solow model by including (i) a CES production function; (ii) product
market imperfections, which are summarized by the price markup; and (iii) labor mar-
ket imperfections, which are introduced through a simple wage equation arising from a
standard eﬃciency wage model and prevent the labor market to clear.
In particular, we assume that the wage is a constant markup over a reference wage
 , so that  =  .15 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the reference wage
depends positively on per capita GDP,   and the employment rate,  :16
 =
µ 

¶µ

¶

It is easy to see that the wage equation simplifies to
 = 
µ

¶µ

¶2

which can be rewritten in eﬃciency units as
e = e (1− )2  (15)
where  is the unemployment rate, e =  and e =   To obtain the equilibrium
unemployment, we use the labor demand equation (2) which can be rewritten in terms of
the capital labor-ratio in eﬃciency units as follows:
e = (1− )
∙

³e´−1 + (1− )¸ 1−1  (16)
15This constant mark up can be obtained in an eﬃciency wage model with eﬀort function  =
h− i
if    and 0    1, which yields  = 11− .
16When wages are set at the firm or sector level, the equilibrium wage depends on unemployment
benefits and the unemployment rate (see, for example, Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, pp.105-106).
If we further relate unemployment benefits with income per capita as, for example, in Daveri and Tabellini
(2000), we obtain a wage equation that depends positively on the employment rate and income per capita
as in our postulated wage equation.
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where e =   Using the wage equation (15) and the labor demand equation (16), we
obtain the unemployment rate in equilibrium:
1−  =
sµ
1− 

¶e( 1−1)  (17)
where e arises from rewriting the production function (1) in eﬃciency units of labor as
e = (e) = ∙³e´−1 + (1− )¸ −1  (18)
Assuming an inelastic labor supply, , that grows at the constant rate, , equation (17)
can be rewritten in terms of the growth rate of employment as
+1
 = (1 + )
sµ 
+1
¶µe+1e
¶( 1−1) (19)
To close the model we characterize capital accumulation. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume a constant savings rate so that capital evolves according to the following equation
+1 =  + (1− )
where  ∈ (0 1) is the constant savings rate and  ∈ (0 1) is the constant depreciation
rate. We rewrite this equation in labor eﬃciency units as
e+1 = µ +1
¶µ 
+1
¶h
e + (1− )ei  (20)
Then, we use equations (18) and (19) to obtain the following diﬀerence equation
e+1 = (1 + )−1
vuutµ+1

¶Ã(e+1)
(e)
!(1− 1 )µ 
+1
¶h
(e) + (1− )ei  (21)
Equation (21) drives the accumulation of capital in this economy.
6.2 Numerical simulation
We first obtain the path of capital accumulation by solving numerically equation (21),
and we then use equations (3), (18), and (19) to simulate the paths of the LIS, the ratio
of capital to GDP, per worker GDP, and the growth rate of employment.
We calibrate the parameters as follows. First of all, we use the estimated values of ,
the average values of  and , and the computed values of the price markup for Spain
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and the U.S. To obtain eﬃciency units of labor we compute the Solow residual from an
accounting exercise based on equation (5). We take into account that the Solow residual is
aﬀected by the price markup (Hall, 1988).17 We ensure that the simulated values depart
from the actual values of the variables by setting the value of  accordingly, and by
fixing the initial amounts of capital stock and technology (in eﬃciency units) to match,
respectively, the ratio of capital to GDP and per worker GDP. The values of the savings
rate are set to calibrate the ratio of capital to GDP. To obtain a close simulation we
have had to split the sample period into two. In this way, we are able to deal with the
exceptionally high saving rates of Spain during the first 6 years of the sample, and the
low U.S. rates of the first 10 years. This information is summarized in Table 7.
Table 7. Parameter values.
     1 2
Spain
Scenario I 1.58
√
0.043 0.0104 0.12 0.270 0.135
Scenario II 1.21
√
0.043 0.0104 0.27 0.240 0.160
U.S.
Scenario I 0.63 X 0.043 0.0144 0.22 0.155 0.185
Scenario II 0.90 X 0.043 0.0144 0.32 0.145 0.150
It is important to emphasize the diﬀerent nature of the exercise undertaken in this
section relative to the simulation performed in Section 5. Rather than checking the relative
incidence of the price markup and capital deepening on the LIS trajectory, we have now
developed a model in which capital accumulation is explained. By equation (20), this
requires the use of Solow’s residual, as computed by equation (5), which is time-varying
and entails the need to pay attention to both the trend and cyclical components of the
series. This is the reason why we do not filter the series under scrutiny. Moreover, there
is an important remark related to the restricted period for which the simulation exercise
is conducted, from 1979 to 2007. When the whole sample period is considered, the model
fails to produce a good fit in the 1960s and 1970s. We thus acknowledge that some
relevant determinants of the macroeconomic scene in the first part of the sample are not
well captured by our stylized analysis.18 In contrast, the model performs reasonably well
when explaining the evolution of the labor share, employment, GDP per worker, and the
17Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and previously Hall (1988 and 1990), argue that the Solow residual
is biased if the price markup is not considered. Its obtention, therefore, is also important in growth
accounting, specifically when computing the Solow residual.
18Among other elements, we probably lack (i) the relevant influence of the inflationary oil price shocks
and the subsequent deflationary interest rate shocks; (ii) a more realistic specification of the wage setting
process; and (iii) an explicit specification of labor supply decisions which, in those years, were aﬀected
by demographic changes such as the baby-boom and the baby-bust. Although all of them are clearly
important, consideration of these factors lies beyond the scope of the specific exercise we conduct in this
Section.
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ratio of capital stock to GDP. This is shown in Figures 6, for Spain, and 7, for the U.S.,
while Table 8 evaluates these simulations through the RSS (to check their global fit) and
the ratio between the actual and simulated standard deviations (to check their fit in terms
of volatility).
Figure 6. Simulated selected variables in Spain.
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Note: Simulations I and II correspond, respectively, to Scenarios I and II in Table 7.
We find scenario I to track reasonably well the evolution of the labor share, employment
growth, and the ratio of capital stock to GDP in both Spain and the US. On the contrary,
Scenario II fails to capture the downward trend in the labor share during these years, and
yields unrealistic flat trajectories of the LIS and the growth rate of employment. In terms
of GDP per worker, Scenario I allows a close replication of the actual upward trajectory
in clear contrast with the flawed predictions of Scenario II. In the case of Spain it also
captures the inflection point experienced in the second half of the 1990s, when the wild-
ride years started and produced the unprecedented employment boost in response to the
rapid economic growth that became the trademark of this economy.
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Figure 7. Simulated selected variables in the U.S.
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Note: Simulations I and II correspond, respectively, to Scenarios I and II in Table 7.
Table 8 confirms that Scenario I provides a better fit than Scenario II. Note that
whenever the RSS is not conclusive (i.e. for the labor share and the ratio between capital
stock and GDP in the U.S., and for employment growth in both economies), their relative
volatilities are closer to 1 due to the low volatility characterizing Scenario II. The close
fit in terms of the volatilities of GDP per worker and the ratio of capital stock to GDP is
remarkable for both economies. This implies that our simulations under scenario I, that
is when the markup is considered, are specially suitable to account for the facts when
these facts involve a time-varying pattern of the variables. Given that this is generally
the case, the role played by the price markup should not be disregarded.
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Table 8. Simulated variables’ fit.
 ∆  ∗∆ 
RSS RV RSS RV RSS RV RSS RV
Spain
Scenario I 0.007 1.89 0.023 0.55 0.277 1.22 0.215 0.76
Scenario II 0.016 0.09 0.020 0.01 0.959 0.54 0.184 0.50
U.S.
Scenario I 0.003 1.92 0.003 1.43 0.328 0.98 0.060 0.76
Scenario II 0.003 0.02 0.003 0.01 0.810 0.39 0.040 0.38
Notes: RSS=Residual sum of squares; RV=Relative volatility (simulated std. dev.actual std. dev. ).
Scenario I: ˆ = 158 in Spain; ˆ = 063 in he US; markup considered;
Scenario II: ˆ = 121 in Spain; ˆ = 090 in he US; markup not considered.
Overall, it seems safe to claim that consideration of the price markup in the analysis
provides a relevant insight when attempting to explain the evolution of the key macro-
economic variables in last decades.
7 Conclusions
We provide estimates of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor under
imperfect competition in the product market. This elasticity is larger than one in Spain
and lower than one in the U.S.
An important contribution of the paper is the rationale behind these diﬀerent values.
Both economies have experienced a declining path of the LIS and, at the same time, diﬀer
in the evolution of capital deepening. The paper reconciles these facts by unveiling the
connection between the elasticity of substitution, capital deepening, and the trajectory of
the time-varying LIS.
One important aspect of this connection is that the elasticity of substitution determines
the eﬀect of capital deepening on the LIS which, in turn, depends on the time-varying
price markup. In showing this, the paper uncovers the bias that the assumption of perfect
competition introduces in the estimates of the elasticity of substitution. This bias drives
the estimated elasticity of substitution towards one irrespective of whether this estimate
is placed above or below one. We believe this is an important result of the paper.
The diﬀerences in the elasticity of substitution have interesting implications for the
relationship between other aggregate variables. For example, higher wages imply a reduc-
tion of the LIS in Spain, as a result of the large substitution between capital and labor,
while they drive it upwards in the U.S., on account of the small substitutability between
capital and labor.
In the final part of the paper we use the estimated elasticities and the price markups
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in Spain and the U.S. to conduct two simulation exercises. In the first one, we examine
to what extent the trajectory of the LIS is explained by capital deepening and the price
markup. For Spain we find that the former accounts for 63% of the changes in the
LIS, while the price markup accounts for 27% of them. For the U.S. these values are,
respectively, 57% and 39%.
In the second simulation, we extend the Solow model by considering a CES production
function, and imperfect competition in the labor and product markets. We solve this
model numerically in two relevant scenarios, and we conclude that neglecting the degree
of imperfect competition —in our case measured by the time-series aggregate price markup—
makes the model invalid for predicting the relationship between crucial macroeconomic
variables such as capital, GDP, and the LIS. On the contrary, when the price markup
is taken into account, the model yields predictions that are broadly consistent with the
data.
The empirical findings in this paper open two relevant issues. The first one relates
to the causes behind the diﬀerent elasticity of substitution in Spain and the U.S. Among
others, some potential candidates are diﬀerences in the sectoral composition of GDP, in the
composition of the labor force (skilled/unskilled), and in the institutional environment.19
The second issue relates to the high correlation between capital deepening and the price
markup. The explanation of this finding would obviously require to consider models with
endogenous markups. These new and interesting research avenues will be the aim of
future research.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D.K. (2002): “Directed Technical Change”, Review of Economic Studies, vol.
69, pp. 781-810.
[2] Altug, S. and A. Filiztekin (2002): “Scale eﬀects, time-varying markups, and the cyclical
behaviour of primal and dual productivity”, Applied Economics, vol. 34, pp. 1687-1702.
19We believe that a potentially crucial explanation could be the institutional environment in which firms
have traditionally operated in these two countries. Spain has evolved from a highly rigid and regulated
economy to a liberalized situation with a salient characteristic: its segmented labor market. Indeed, for
the last 25 years, a third of dependent employment has been holding a temporary contract, while the
other two thirds belonged to a highly protected permanent segment (see Dolado, García-Serrano, and
Jimeno, 2002). Together with traditional diﬃculties in funding access (due to the small firms’ average size
and, until recently, financial markets underdevelopment and scarce competition in the banking system),
Spanish firms have tended to live in a situation of expensive capital and progressively cheap labor. This,
we believe, may have led them to a relatively high sensitivity in factor substitution. On the contrary,
the US economy is the paradigm of a deregulated environment in which firms are less constrained by
regulations and, thus, less sensitive to changes in factor prices: prices in the U.S. have probably been
driven by the market and not that much, as in Spain, by deregulation processes of diﬀerent intensities in
the product, labor, and financial markets. This provides less incentives to be opportunistic in search of
the best factor combination resulting from changing regulations and institutions.
29
[3] Antràs, P. (2004): “Is the U.S. Aggregate Production Function Cobb-Douglas? New es-
timates of the Elasticity of Substitution”, Contributions to Macroeconomics, vol. 4 (1),
Article 4.
[4] Arpaia, A., E. Pérez and K. Pichelmann (2009): “Understanding labour income share dy-
namics in Europe”, European Economy Economic Papers, No. 379, European Comission,
Brussels.
[5] Banerjee, A. and B. Rusell (2004): “A reinvestigation of the markup and the business
cycle”, Economic Modelling, vol. 21, pp. 267-284.
[6] Bentolila, S. and Saint-Paul, G. (2003): “Explaining movements in the labor share”, Con-
tributions to Macroeconomics, vol. 3 (1), Article 9.
[7] Bils (1987): “The Cyclical Behavior of Marginal Cost and Price”, The American Economic
Review, vol. 77 (5), pp. 838-855.
[8] Choi, S. and J.V. Ríos-Rull (2008): “Understanding the Dynamics of Labor Share: The
Role of Noncompetitive Factor Prices”, mimeo.
[9] Daveri, F. and G. Tabellini (2000): “Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial
countries”, Economic Policy, vol. 15(30), p. 47-104.
[10] Dolado, J.J., C. García-Serrano, and J.F. Jimeno (2002): “Drawing lessons from the boom
of temporary jobs in Spain”, The Economic Journal, 112 (480), pp. F270-F295.
[11] Driver, C. and J. Muñoz-Bugarín (2009): “Capital investment and unemployment in Eu-
rope: Neutrality or not?”, Journal of Macroeconomics, forthcoming.
[12] Duﬀy, J. and C. Papageorgiu (2000): “A Cross-Country Empirical Investigation of the
Aggregate Production Function Specification”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 5, pp.
87-120.
[13] Estrada, Á. and J.D. López-Salido (2005): “Sectoral Mark-ups Dynamics in Spain”, Doc-
umentos de Trabajo del Banco de España, No. 0503, Bank of Spain, Madrid.
[14] Galí, J. (1995): “Product diversity, endogenous markups, and development traps”, Journal
of Monetary Economics, vol. 36, pp. 39-63.
[15] Galí, J. (1996): “Multiple equilibria in a growth model with monopolistic competition”,
Economic Theory, vol. 8, pp. 251-266.
[16] Gollin, D. (2002): “Getting Income Shares Right”, The Journal of Political Economy, vol.
110 (2), pp. 458-474.
[17] Hall, R.E. (1988): “The relation between price and marginal cost in U.S. industry”, The
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96 (5), pp. 921-947.
[18] Hall, R.E. (1990): “Invariance properties of Solow’s productivity residual”, in P. Diamond
(ed.), Growth/ Productivity/Unemployment: Essays to Celebrate Bob Solow’s Birthday,
MIT Press, pp. 71-112.
[19] Harris, R. and Sollis, R. (2003): Applied Time Series Modelling and Forecasting, Wiley,
West Sussex.
[20] Hsieh, C.T. (1998):
[21] Hsieh, C.T. (1999): “Productivity Growth and Factor Prices in East Asia”, The American
Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, vol. 89 (2), pp. 133-138.
[22] Jaimovich, N. and M. Floetotto (2008): “Firm dynamics, markup variations, and the
business cycle”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 55, pp. 1238-1252.
30
[23] Karanassou, M., Sala, H. and Snower, D.J. (2003): “Unemployment in the European Union:
a dynamic reappraisal”, Economic Modelling, vol. 20 (2), pp. 237-273.
[24] Klump, R., P. McAdam, and A. Willman (2007): “Factor substitution and factor-
augmenting technical progress in the United States: A normalized supply-side system ap-
proach”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 89 (1), pp. 183-192.
[25] Klump, R. and H. Preissler (2000): “CES production functions and economic growth”,
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 102, pp. 41-56.
[26] Layard, R., Nickell, S.J., and R. Jackman (1991): “Unemployment: Macroeconomic Per-
formance and the Labour Market”, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[27] Pesaran, M.H. and Y. Shin (1999): “An Autoregressive Distributed-Lag Modelling Ap-
proach to Cointegration Analysis” in S. Strom (ed.), Econometrics and Economic Theory
in the Twentieth Century: The Ragnar Frisch Centennial Symposium, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, pp. 371-413.
[28] Pesaran, M.H., Shin, Y. and Smith, R.J. (2001): “Bounds testing approaches to the analysis
of level relationships”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 16, pp. 289-326.
[29] Ravn, M., Schmitt-Grohe, S., and Uribe, M. (2004): “Deep Habits”, NBER Working Paper
No. 10261, NBER, Cambridge: MA.
[30] Ríos-Rull, V. and R. Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2009): “Redistributive Shocks and Productivity
Shocks”, mimeo.
[31] Roeger (1995): “Can Imperfect Competition Explain the Diﬀerence between Primal and
Dual Productivity Measures? Estimates for U.S. Manufacturing”, The Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 103 (2), pp. 316-330.
[32] Rotemberg, J.J. and M. Woodford (1999): “The cyclical behavior of prices and costs”, in
J.B. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1B, pp. 1051-1135.
[33] Rowthorn, R. (1999): “Unemployment, wage bargaining and capital-labour substitution”,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 23, pp. 413-425.
31
